Junagadh and the genesis of mistrust: An analysis of Telegram 34-GG

New Delhi, Sep 21 (IANS) In the tumultuous months following the partition of the Indian subcontinent, the newly independent dominions of India and Pakistan were confronted with a series of complex and often volatile challenges. Among the most pressing was the integration of over 500 princely states, which had been granted the choice to accede to either dominion or remain Independent under the Indian Independence Act of 1947.

While most states made decisions based on geographical contiguity and the religion of their majority population, a few became flashpoints of intense dispute. The case of Junagadh, a princely state in Kathiawar, emerged as one of the earliest and most significant Constitutional and diplomatic crises, setting a contentious precedent for the larger conflict over Jammu and Kashmir.

At the heart of this crisis was a frantic series of communications between New Delhi and Karachi. A pivotal document in this exchange was the telegram (34-GG) sent by India's Ministry of External Affairs to its Pakistani counterpart on September 21, 1947.

This communication, though one of many, encapsulates the core legal, political, and strategic arguments that defined the Junagadh dispute and highlighted the deep-seated mistrust that characterized early Indo-Pakistani relations.

Context: The Contested Accession

The state of Junagadh presented a constitutional anomaly. It had a majority Hindu population (over 80 per cent) but was ruled by a Muslim Nawab, Muhammad Mahabat Khanji III. Despite being geographically surrounded by Indian territory and states that had acceded to India, the Nawab, influenced by his Dewan, Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto, announced his decision to accede to Pakistan on August 15, 1947. Pakistan formally accepted this accession on September 12, 1947.

This decision was met with immediate and forceful opposition from the Government of India. New Delhi's position was rooted in several key principles:

1. Geographical Contiguity: Junagadh was not contiguous with Pakistan by land, a factor India considered paramount for a viable and peaceful accession.

2. Will of the People: India argued that the accession ignored the wishes of the predominantly Hindu population, a stance that was ironically in contrast to its position on Kashmir, where it upheld the ruler's right to accede.

3. Economic and Administrative Disruption: Junagadh's accession to Pakistan threatened to disrupt the administrative and economic integrity of the Kathiawar region, creating an isolated pocket of foreign territory within India.

The Diplomatic Barrage: September 1947

The period following Pakistan's acceptance of Junagadh's accession was marked by a rapid and escalating exchange of telegrams between the two governments.

September 12: Immediately upon learning of Pakistan's acceptance, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru cabled his Pakistani counterpart, Liaquat Ali Khan, stating that India could "never and do not acquiesce in" the accession. He termed it an "encroachment on India’s Sovereignty and territory" and a violation of the principles upon which partition was based. The same day, Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry informed India that it had accepted the accession.

September 17: A meeting of the Indian Cabinet resolved to oppose the accession and take necessary measures, including economic pressure and troop deployment on the state's borders.

September 19: As tensions mounted, Pakistan cabled India, alleging that "armed men from Indian Union territory" were preparing to invade Junagadh and create disturbances.

The Telegram 34-GG of September 21, 1947: India's Definitive Stand

It was against this backdrop of rising tensions and mutual accusations that India dispatched its telegram, No. 34-GG, on September 21, 1947 . The telegram was a direct and detailed rebuttal to Pakistan's message of September 19 and served as a formal articulation of India's non-acceptance of the accession. The key points and their analysis are as follows:

1. Rejection of Pakistani Allegations: The telegram categorically denied Pakistan’s claims that India was preparing an invasion. It stated, "allegations regarding armed men preparing to invade Junagadh and create disturbances there from Indian Union territory are entirely baseless." This denial was crucial for India to maintain the moral high ground and frame its subsequent actions—an economic blockade and troop movements—as defensive and aimed at maintaining regional stability rather than aggression.

2. Assertion of the Will of the People: The communication powerfully reiterated India's central argument that the accession was illegitimate because it ignored the popular will. It asserted that there was "overwhelming evidence of desire of vast majority of people of Junagadh to remain in Indian Union despite accession of State to Pakistan." This was a strategic line of reasoning. While upholding the ruler's legal right to choose in the case of Kashmir, India championed popular sovereignty in Junagadh, demonstrating a flexible, if inconsistent, application of principles to suit its national interest.

3. Legitimizing the Provisional Government: The telegram sought to legitimize the "Arzi Hukumat" or Provisional Government, formed by Junagadh citizens in Bombay under the leadership of Samaldas Gandhi. It described the movement as an indigenous popular uprising against the Nawab's decision, stating that the people "have decided to resist decision by all means at their disposal and have set up a provisional Government."* By framing the Arzi Hukumat as a legitimate expression of popular will, India created a political instrument to challenge the Nawab’s authority from within and justify its own support for the anti-accession movement.

4. A Veiled Threat and a Call for Reversal: The telegram concluded with a stern warning and a clear demand. It stated that India "cannot be expected to acquiesce in a situation in which a State with overwhelming non-Muslim population which is geographically and economically an integral part of India is driven into acceding to Pakistan against the known wishes of the people." This was followed by an explicit request for Pakistan to reconsider its acceptance of the accession, thereby offering a diplomatic off-ramp to avoid direct conflict.

Aftermath and Analysis

The telegram of September 21 did not de-escalate the crisis; rather, it solidified the irreconcilable positions of the two dominions. Pakistan responded the next day, on September 22, reiterating that the accession was "complete, final and irrevocable" and warned India that any interference would be considered an "act of aggression" against Pakistan itself.

The Indian government proceeded to tighten its economic blockade, cutting off supplies of essential goods to Junagadh. It also moved troops to the state's borders to "restore order" . This strategy, combined with the activities of the Arzi Hukumat, which began seizing outlying territories of Junagadh, created an untenable situation for the state administration.

The crisis reached its climax in late October and early November 1947. With the state's economy collapsing and facing imminent invasion, the Nawab fled to Karachi. His Dewan, Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto, facing a complete breakdown of governance, requested the Government of India to take over the administration on November 8, 1947 . Indian forces entered Junagadh on November 9. A plebiscite was later held in February 1948, which resulted in an overwhelming vote in favor of accession to India.

The telegram of September 21, 1947, is therefore a crucial historical document. It illustrates the fundamental ideological and geopolitical collision between India and Pakistan in their formative days. For India, the principles of geographical integrity and popular will were paramount. For Pakistan, the legal right of a princely ruler to accede, especially a Muslim ruler, was a cornerstone of its claim, forming part of a broader vision to create "multiple artificial entities" based on the platform of Islam.

Conclusion: Junagadh, A Microcosm of a Fractured Relationship

The Junagadh crisis, crystallized in documents like Telegram 34-GG dated September 21, 1947, serves as a powerful and insightful microcosm of the foundational fractures that would define India-Pakistan relations for decades to come. This single communication, though brief, encapsulates the core elements of the nascent conflict: Pakistan's invocation of legal formalism versus India's insistence on geographical and popular realities, all set against a backdrop of rapidly escalating mistrust.

In the telegram, India’s Ministry of External Affairs rebuffs Pakistan's protestations about the "economic blockade" of Junagadh, firmly stating that any disruptions were a natural consequence of the state's sudden detachment from its geographical and economic hinterland after acceding to Pakistan. This document is not merely a diplomatic exchange; it is a declaration of India’s fundamental position. It underscores the Indian view that Pakistan’s acceptance of Junagadh's accession was an act of political opportunism—an attempt to create an artificial entity "hundreds of miles away from its shores" on the same ideological platform of religion that birthed Pakistan itself. This move was seen by New Delhi not just as illogical, but as a deliberate provocation aimed at undermining India's consolidation in the immediate post-partition chaos.

The Junagadh affair, as highlighted by this exchange, reveals the diametrically opposed principles guiding the two new dominions. Pakistan, in its claim over Junagadh, clung to the "legal and constitutional" right of a ruler to accede to either dominion, a principle its Prime Minister had publicly championed. India, conversely, argued that such legalism was a "fraud" when it defied geographical contiguity, economic viability, and, most importantly, the will of the people.

This fundamental clash—between a ruler's legal prerogative and the people's democratic aspirations—would become the enduring battleground for the far more complex and protracted conflict over Jammu and Kashmir.

Ultimately, the Junagadh episode was a prelude. It established a pattern of mutual suspicion and recrimination that poisoned bilateral relations from the outset.

Documents from this period show how quickly Junagadh became intertwined with accusations of sabotage, military posturing, and a propaganda war that painted the other side as an aggressor bent on destruction. The crisis demonstrated Pakistan's initial ambition to challenge India's territorial integrity beyond the immediate boundaries of Partition and India's resolve to counter such moves decisively, setting a precedent for future confrontations.

Therefore, Telegram 34-GG and the surrounding events are not a mere historical footnote; they are the opening chapter in a long and tragic narrative of conflict, illustrating that the seeds of discord were sown not just in the fields of Punjab or the valleys of Kashmir, but also on the shores of Kathiawar.

(The author is a researcher specialising in Indian history and contemporary geopolitical affairs)

--IANS

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