5 questions after Operation Sindoor

#1 Did our security agencies fail to respond to ‘actionable intelligence’ that Pahalgam may be targeted?

Between 2 and 22 February 2025, US space tech and geospatial intelligence firm Maxar Technologies witnessed a spike in satellite image requests for Pahalgam. It reportedly received 12 orders for high resolution images of Pahalgam and its strategically sensitive surroundings. Additional requests were placed on 12 April, just 10 days before the terror strike. Business Systems International (BSI), a Pakistani geospatial firm, was Maxar’s partner at the time.

Hours after the report (by Soumya Pillai in ThePrint) appeared on 9 May, Maxar dropped BSI. Question: was this ‘actionable intelligence’ that Indian agencies failed to act on? Should the spike in demand for satellite images alongside the fact that Maxar has a Pakistani partner have rung alarm bells? Were Indian intelligence agencies aware of the connection? And the fact that the BSI founder Obaidullah Syed was convicted earlier for illegally exporting nuclear-related technology to Pakistan’s Atomic Energy Commission?

President Donald Trump continues his grandstanding on brokering peace

#2 By acknowledging the Trump administration’s hand in mediating a ceasefire, has Pakistan successfully ‘internationalised’ the Kashmir issue once again?

Even as India strained to dismiss US President Donald Trump’s claim of a ‘’, the effusive response from Islamabad left nobody in any doubt why Pakistan was so happy to acknowledge the Trump administration’s role in the cessation of military hostilities. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s offer to arrange a second round of talks between India and Pakistan at a ‘neutral site’ and Trump’s offer to mediate a solution to the “thousand-year-old Kashmir dispute” (sic) were diplomatic signals that Pakistan had managed to re-introduce a third party in the Kashmir discussion, which, under the Simla Agreement of 1972, the two neighbours had agreed to manage bilaterally.

By openly and repeatedly thanking Trump, Islamabad positioned his offer as proof that Kashmir —reinforcing its decades-old strategy of internationalising the issue through platforms like the United Nations. India, on the other hand, has always opposed it. The longer term impact of Trump’s grandstanding on brokering peace between two ‘nuclear-armed neighbours’ is not clear, but for now Pakistan will certainly count it as a diplomatic coup.

#3 Was India outmanoeuvred diplomatically?

India’s diplomatic outreach following the Pahalgam attack failed to isolate Pakistan. Even after presenting what it described as clear evidence of Pakistani involvement in the attack, India did not manage to extract an explicit condemnation of Pakistan from any major global power or grouping such as the G7 or G20, or the BRICS or Quad nations. Even after Operation Sindoor, no leading nation publicly endorsed India’s military response. While some countries issued calls for restraint and de-escalation, none unequivocally supported India’s right to retaliate.

China, on the other hand, openly backed Pakistan with advanced weapons systems, real-time surveillance data and intelligence cooperation. At the United Nations, Beijing shielded Islamabad, working with other nations to soften references to Pakistan based terror groups in Security Council discussions. China also blocked any mention of The Resistance Force (TRF), the group that claimed responsibility for the Pahalgam attack, at the UN sanctions committee.

Turkey and Azerbaijan openly sided with Pakistan. In a conspicuous display of solidarity, Turkey deployed six military aircraft and a warship to Pakistan, referring to the country as its ‘brother’. To add to India’s diplomatic frustration, Pakistan secured the immediate release of $1 billion in international financial assistance—despite mounting evidence of its links to cross-border terrorism.

#4 The official Indian narrative on the hits and misses of this war are not supported by third-party assessments. But claims and counterclaims aside, is India prepared for a ‘two-front war’?

With a significantly larger defence budget and nearly $700 billion in foreign exchange reserves, India has an economic in sustaining a long-term conflict. However, India’s defence leadership has openly said that a ‘two-front war’—simultaneous hostilities with both China and Pakistan—is no longer just a theoretical possibility.

Debris of a crashed drone

Many experts consider India’s current force posture—particularly in the realm of air power—light for a two-front confrontation. The steady supply of Chinese hardware and technology to Pakistan since 2020, and its open multi dimensional support in the recent confrontation have made a two-front war even more daunting. While the Indian leadership continues to express confidence in the country’s preparedness, independent global analyses question India’s capacity to decisively prosecute a two-front war.

At a rally in Bihar after the Pahalgam incident the prime minister said, “We will follow them till the end of the earth”

#5 In PM Modi’s words, India now sees ‘no difference between terrorists and a State that openly supports terror’. Beyond the rhetoric, what does this mean?

Given that it is wagging its finger at Pakistan, the Modi government seems to be saying that India will treat acts of terror as State-sponsored by default, which will then invite a response that India deems fit. If we go by the most recent cycle of provocation (Pahalgam) and retaliation (Sindoor), the signal might be that it was restrained this time, and it’ll be worse the next time. Experts have drawn attention to the futility of trying to deal with terror purely militarily—history bears witness (see ‘You can’t just bomb away terrorism’, page 1). The new doctrine—if it is that—is possibly signalling a zero-tolerance response to terror, but in trying to draw a new red line, is perhaps misreading the nature of the enemy.

Other experts have pointed out that this policy might hold India hostage to individual terrorist actions. It is possible, though, that it’s more hot air than a doctrine, directed at assuaging hotheads in the ruling party’s support base or burnishing Mr Modi’s strongman image ahead of important state elections.